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I. Introduction
T he Internal Revenue Code (Code) generally is the first place to look when con fronting a federal tax question, but it is important to recognize that much federal tax law is not statutory. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) promulgates regulations, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues important guidance, such as Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures, and Notices (Hickman, 2009) . Federal courts interpret all of these authorities. In order to understand and apply federal tax law, it is important to appreciate the role that federal trial courts, Courts of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court play in developing the law. This essay provides an overview of federal tax litigation, discusses the deference courts give to guidance issued by the Treasury and IRS, and discusses when taxpayers have "standing" to challenge the tax laws in court. The essay also discusses cases in which Congress may step in to amend the Code following a court decision.
II. Background on Federal Tax Litigation
Federal tax controversies involve disputes between taxpayers and the IRS. Like other kinds of litigation, they may raise factual issues, legal issues, or both. In many cases, the court hearing the case considers not only any governing statute or statutes, but also relevant Treasury and IRS guidance. Courts also take account of applicable case law. There are a variety of types of federal tax cases, but many of them involve a disagreement as to the amount of the tax liability (Cords, 2008) . Most of these cases -over 95 percent 139 (Laro, 1995) -are heard by the U.S. Tax Court, which"has jurisdiction to redetermine income, gift, estate, and certain excise tax deficiencies" (Cords, 2008, p.436). Non-deficiency cases in the Tax Court may involve, for example, collection issues or the defense to liability of"innocent spouse" status (Cords, 2008, p. 436 and fn. 43). Disputes over a tax deficiency often originate from an IRS audit, though they may also arise when a taxpayer amends its return to claim a refund of amounts previously paid. When a dispute arises out of an audit, the IRS cannot assess the tax without first sending the taxpayer a letter known as a"Notice of Deficiency" or"statutory notice." 140 The notice gives the taxpayer the option to petition the Tax Court, so it is sometimes also termed the"ticket to Tax Court" (Lederman, 1996) . The Tax Court has jurisdic-tion not only over the deficiency, but also to consider any overpayment claimed by the taxpayer in its petition. 141 The IRS's mailing of the Notice of Deficiency also starts a"prohibited period" during which the IRS is prohibited from assessing tax. 142 If the taxpayer petitions the Tax Court, the"prohibited period" continues until the Tax Court's decision is final. That includes the time until all appeals have run. 143 If the taxpayer does not timely petition the Tax Court, the IRS will assess the tax.
Rule 91(a)(1) of the Tax Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure requires parties to stipulate to the facts to the fullest extent possible. The court's rules also permit the parties to submit cases fully stipulated. 144 Accordingly, Tax Court trials generally focus on contested issues. Tax Court trials are overseen by a judge, not a jury, and are held in numerous cities around the United States (Lederman and Mazza, 2009, p. 297) . 145 The taxpayer is expected to request a place for trial at the time of filing the petition. If the taxpayer does not do so, the IRS is expected to make such a request in conjunction with its answer. 146 distinct from most courts in that briefs are filed after trial, rather than before trial. 147 Most opinions in regular Tax Court cases are Memorandum Opinions, which are not official pronouncements of the Tax Court, have little precedential value, and are privately published. 148 Some opinions are Division Opinions (sometimes referred to as"full T.C.s"); they have precedential value and are officially published (Cohen, 2001 ). The Chief Judge decides whether a particular opinion will be a Division Opinion or a Memorandum Opinion. 149 Some Tax Court cases are reviewed by the full court in conference. Those decisions are always issued as Division Opinions and include a statement that they were reviewed. They may contain a majority opinion, concurrences, and dissenting opinions. Generally speaking, decisions receive review by the full court when they: (1) decide issues not previously considered by the court; (2) invalidate a Treasury Regulation; (3) would conflict with existing Tax Court decisions; (4) involve an issue not previously considered by the Tax Court and would conflict with the decision of a Court of Appeals other than the one to which appeal would lie; or (5) involve an issue on which the Tax Court has been reversed by a court other than the one with jurisdiction over any appeal (Crimm, 1999) . If a Tax Court case has less than $50,000 in issue for each tax year, the taxpayer can request to have the Tax Court to hear it as a"small tax case" (or"S case").
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The case will then be docketed as an S case, but"[t]he Court, on its own motion or on the motion of a party to the case, may, at any time before the trial commences issue an order directing that the small tax case designation be removed and that the proceedings not be conducted as a small tax case." 151 Small tax cases are considered under more relaxed rules of procedure and evidence, but decisions in them are not appealable.
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Opinions in small tax cases are called Summary Opinions, and they have no precedential value. Because the opinions in S cases have no precedential value, occasionally the Tax Court will move a case out of S case status into the regular procedure if it appears to have broad importance (Nelson and Keightley, 1988) . As of fiscal year 2011, S cases comprised 39.6 percent of the Tax Court's docket.
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The Tax Court is not the only court that hears federal tax cases. For example, if the taxpayer has filed a bankruptcy petition, a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to"determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not 147 155 If an action is pending in Tax Court at the time the taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy court determines whether it or the Tax Court will hear the case (Germain, 2004) . If the converse is the case -durrng a pending bankruptcy action, the taxpayer receives a Notice of Deficiency -Tax Court precedent generally provides that it can consider the deficiency issues, but not the question of whether the tax debt was discharged in bankruptcy. 156 Bankruptcy is something of a special situation in that it applies to a subset of taxpayers, but it is a context in which taxpayers can resolve their substantive tax disputes before having to pay the tax. The other alternatives to Tax Court involve fully paying the tax and then seeking a refund, either in U.S. District Court or in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 157 To pursue this refund route, the taxpayer must pay in full the tax the IRS has claimed is due 158 and then must follow the refund procedures, starting with timely filing a refund claim 159 . The taxpayer may not file suit for a refund until either six months have elapsed from the filing of the claim or the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of disallowance. 160 The taxpayer also faces an outside limit on the time to file suit of two years from the date the IRS mails the notice of disallowance. 161 Far fewer cases are litigated in the refund courts than in Tax Court (Table  1) . 162 The main reason for that is likely the fact that the taxpayer must prepay before pursuing a refund suit, whereas, in Tax Court, the taxpayer need not prepay the deficiency (Laro,1995) . In addition, the Notice of Deficiency informs taxpayers of the Tax Court option and the deadline to file there but says nothing about the refund option, which may result in some unrepresented taxpayers assuming that the Tax Court route is the only one available. 163 In regular Tax Court cases, many taxpayers represent themselves. For example, in 2011, there were 14,907 non-S case petitions, of which 9,750, or 65.4 percent were pro se.
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In S cases, the overwhelming 154 See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a). 155 See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)(A), providing that the bankruptcy court may not determine, among other things,"the amount or legality of a tax, fine, penalty, or addition to tax if such amount or legality was contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the commencement of the case under this title ... . majority of taxpayers proceed pro se. 165 Some initially unrepresented taxpayers hire counsel after filing a Tax Court petition, but once the case is docketed in Tax Court, it cannot be removed to another court or voluntarily dismissed (Lederman, 2001). As Table 1 reflects, the courts' inventory of cases has fluctuated over time.
Tax Court decisions generally are appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Circuit within which the taxpayer resided (or had its principal place of business or principal office) at the time the petition was filed. 166 The Tax Court is an interesting position because it is a national trial court whose decisions are reviewable by multiple circuits. It is possible, for example, that a judge could decide the consolidated cases of multiple parties, each of whom appeal to different circuits. 167 The Tax Court has held that it 165 For example, in 2010, there were 13,747 pro se S case petitions and 1,250 represented S case petitions, and in 2011, there were 13,483 pro se S case petitions and 1,303 represented S case petitions. See In Gitlitz v. Commissioner, an insolvent S Corporation was relieved of its debt. Pursuant to Code § 108(a)(1)(B), the S Corporation excluded the amount of the discharge. Contending that debt relief to an insolvent taxpayer is income, even if it is excluded from gross income, the taxpayer treated the amount relieved as an"item of income" and increased his basis by that amount. After increasing his basis, the taxpayer deducted his share of previously suspended net operating losses. The deductibility of these losses was the ultimate issue (Smith, 2007, p. 50) .
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer could increase his basis by the excluded amount and use that basis to deduct the suspended losses. 174 However, the following year, Congress Although the Treasury has not always followed general administrative law principles, regulations generally are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement of notice to the public and an opportunity to comment (Aprill, 2012). As discussed above, the IRS also produces guidance. 177 Guidance that does not have the"force of law" is not subject to the notice-and-comment requirement and is therefore quicker to produce (Hickman, forthcoming).
The courts generally apply the administrative guidance produced by the IRS and Treasury, though they typically accord Treasury Regulations more deference than IRS guidance (Lederman, 2012). The U.S. Supreme Court recently made clear that the substantial deference established in the leading Chevron case applies to Treasury regulations regardless of whether they were promulgated under the general authority of Code section 7805 or under the authority of a specific statute to which the regulations relate. 178 Chevron provides a two-step process:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 179 The level of deference due guidance such as Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures is less clear, but most 175 The Tax Court found the regulations invalid as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. 183 The decision was reversed on appeal, with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit finding that the regulation should have been given deference under Chevron because the statute was ambiguous. 184 In Lantz v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered a regulation that imposed a two-year filing deadline on a claim for equitable relief from joint and several liability for taxes arising out of a return filed jointly by a married couple. 185 The other portions of the statute contained limitations periods, but the equitable relief provision was silent on whether a deadline applied. 186 Because the case was appealable to the Seventh Circuit, which applied Chevron deference, the Tax Court considered the issue under that standard. 187 It found that imposing a time limit was contrary to the statute under Chevron step one, but that even if it were to reach step two,"the regulation is impermissible because it is contrary to the intent of Congress." 188 The court also stated that "by explicitly creating a 2-year limitation in subsections (b) and (c) but not subsection (f), Congress has 'spoken' by its audible silence." 189 180 As in Swallows Holding, the Tax Court's decision in Lantz was reversed on appeal. In an opinion by Judge Posner, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that it"would not accept 'audible silence' as a reliable guide to congressional meaning.
'Audible silence,' like Milton's 'darkness visible' or the Zen koan 'the sound of one hand clapping,' requires rather than guides interpretation. Lantz's brief translates 'audible silence' as 'plain language,' and adds (mysticism must be catching) that 'Congress intended the plain language of the language used in the statute."
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The court further stated that"The delegation in section 6015(f) is express, and the cases are legion that say that Treasury regulations are entitled to judicial deference . . . ." and deferred to the regulation. 191 Following that and other decisions upholding the two-year limitations period, the IRS changed its view and issued a Notice stating,"Notwithstanding these court decisions, Treasury and the IRS have concluded that the regulations issued under section 6015 should be revised so that individuals who request equitable relief under section 6015(f) will no longer be required to submit a request for equitable relief within two years of the IRS's first collection activity against the requesting spouse with respect to the joint tax liability." 192 Even more recently, a controversy erupted over regulations interpreting the time period within which the IRS can assess tax (Lederman, 2012, pp. 679-687). 193 The regulations interpreted two Code sections that extend the usual limitations period from three years to six where there was a substantial omission from income. Under the approach of the regulations, the longer period applies where the omission was caused by the inflation of tax basis outside the context of a trade or business.
Because the regulations were targeted at a well-known tax shelter (commonly known as"Son of BOSS") that had many investors, the regulations were at issue in a number of court cases (Lederman, 2012, p. 679). One of the early decisions was by the Tax Court, which considered the Temporary regulations. It held that the regulations were both not applicable because of the terms of the effective date provision, 194 and invalid and therefore not entitled to deference. 195 The Tax Court reached the conclusion that the regulations were invalid because it found that, under the first step of Chevron, the statute was unambiguous according to a Supreme Court case, Colony, 196 that had interpreted a previous version of the statute but had referred to the later version in dicta. 197 Intermountain was reversed on appeal 198 
IV. Standing Issues
The regulations discussed above all imposed restrictions on taxpayers, either limit-ing their ability to make a claim, or, in the case of Intermountain, resulting in a longer period for assessment of tax. What about regulations that are arguably more generous than a statute, resulting in forgone revenue to the federal fisc, for which we all pay indirectly? Polsky (2009, p. 239) has explained that,"[i]n general, taxpayers do not have standing in a suit that concerns someone else's taxes because the relief sought would not benefit the taxpayer in any tangible way. In other words, a person does not have standing to challenge a tax rule merely because of one's status as a taxpayer; rather, the person must suffer a tangible injury in order to challenge the validity of a regulation."
For example, in DiamlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 206 the Supreme Court ruled that in order for the taxpayers to have standing to challenge an Ohio franchise tax credit, they had to satisfy the requirement in Article III of the U.S. Constitution that there be an actual case or controversy. 207 The Court stated,"The requisite elements of this 'core component derived directly from the Constitution' are familiar: 'A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." 208 More recently, in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 209 the Supreme Court considered a Constitutional challenge to a state tax credit for contributions to school tuition organizations, which"use these contributions to provide scholarships to students attending private schools, many of which are religious." 210 The Court explained that the"case or controversy" requirement of Article III requires standing. 212 Thus, in general, the remedy for a taxpayer with a general grievance about how the government spends its money is not through the courts. Instead, the taxpayer must use the political system and attempt to get the government to change its policies. 213 Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization found the Flast exception inapplicable because the case involved tax credits rather than a governmental expenditure. 214 In some cases involving a taxpayerfriendly regulation or IRS guidance, there might nonetheless be a circumstance in which a taxpayer is in the unusual position of being directly harmed by it and thus able to bring a challenge. For example, with respect to the taxpayer-friendly elective entity classification regime known as"Check-the-Box, 
V. Conclusion
As the discussion above shows, despite the importance of the Code, there are several important non-statutory sources of federal tax law. Along with Congress, the courts, the Treasury, and the IRS all play important roles in the development of the tax law. The role of the courts typically is to interpret tax statutes, regulations, and other tax rules and apply the law in cases before them. Court decisions generally have precedential value. However, Congress makes frequent changes to the tax law, and, even if it is not responding to a particular case, the amendments may make prior case law irrelevant. Similarly, the Treasury or IRS may change a regulation or ruling, in which case a court hearing a future case will be faced with a novel question. This nuanced dance among the three branches of government is part of what makes federal tax law so interesting.
